Joint cooperative activities among firms, particularly with respect to R&D, are important features of many industries and influence profitability and technological innovation (see e.g. Hagedoorn, 2002; Powell et al., 2005; Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 2006) . Examples of R&D cooperation include the formation of research joint ventures or clusters, the exchange of information, and the share of laboratories or facilities. In many cases, the firms cooperating on the R&D level are competitors in the market, which gives rise to intricate strategic considerations when selecting R&D partners, or deciding on the investments in R&D. Several trade-offs have to be considered: joining a consortium of firms allows a given firm to access the spillovers generated by R&D while it also embodies a contribution to joint activities which benefit and strengthen the competitors. Investments in R&D are decided on the individual firm level which gives incentives to free-ride on others' investments. However, investing low in R&D may leave a firm as a very unattractive partner outside of a research cluster. Hence, by determining the investments in R&D and joining a consortium, a firm faces the trade-off between attracting partners and free-riding on others' effort.
By focusing on these long-term investments in R&D and modeling this as the first stage, we are, hence, able to provide a complete characterization of a model of endogeneous R&D efforts and endongeneous group formation. In similar models in the literature, only incomplete characterizations arise since those models cannot be solved analytically. One example is the model of Greenlee (2005) which is similar to our framework except that the first and second stage of the game are reversed, giving investment decisions a rather flexible than a long-term interpretation. However, in such a model, it is impossible to characterize the resulting coalition structures. The same is true when R&D joint ventures are restricted to bilateral (non-exclusive) cooperations, i.e. focusing on R&D networks as the first stage while investments are endogeneous in the second stage (see e.g. Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez, 2001; Goyal et al., 2008) . Only for exogenous and homogeneous investments, characterizations of group formation (Bloch, 1995) and network formation (Goyal and Joshi, 2003; Dawid and Hellmann, 2014) have been provided. Moreover, to the literature on group formation when investments are exogeneous (Bloch, 1995; Yi, 1998) , we also contribute by analyzing the case of heterogeneous investments since these are taken as given in the second stage.
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